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Responsible Accounting for Stakeholders

Jeffrey S. Harrison and Joyce van der Laan Smith
University of Richmond
ABSTRACT Through a critique of existing ﬁnancial theory underlying current accounting
practices, and reapplication of this theory to a broad group of stakeholders, this paper lays a
normative foundation for a revised perspective on the responsibility of the public accounting
profession. Speciﬁcally, we argue that the profession should embrace the development of
standards for reporting information important to a broader group of stakeholders than just
investors and creditors. The FASB has recently moved in the opposite direction. Nonetheless,
an institution around accounting for stakeholders continues to grow, backed by a groundswell
of support from many sources. Based on institutional theory, we predict that this institution
and the forces supporting it will cause changes in the public accounting profession, even if
through coercion. We also provide examples of stakeholder accounting, building from the
premise that a primary responsibility of accounting is to provide information to address the
risk management needs of stakeholders.

Keywords: accounting principles, corporate responsibility, FASB, stakeholder accounting,
stakeholder theory

INTRODUCTION
So it has come to this. The global biodiversity crisis is so severe that brilliant scientists, political
leaders, eco-warriors, and religious gurus can no longer save us from ourselves. The military are
powerless. But there may be one last hope for life on earth: accountants.
Jonathan Watts, Guardian, October 28, 2010
The reporting climate for social accountability purposes has changed dramatically in
the last few decades. Worldwide interest in environmental sustainability has led to initiatives such as the ISO 14000 standards, the Greenhouse Gas Protocol, the Social
Accountability Network’s SA8000 standard and the work of the Global Reporting
InitiativeTM (GRI, 2013), among many others, resulting in signiﬁcantly more reporting
on the environmental and social impact of ﬁrm operations. It has also become accepted
Address for reprints: Jeffrey S. Harrison, Robins School of Business, University of Richmond, Richmond,
VA, 23173 USA (harrison@richmond.edu).
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practice for large, global companies to issue sustainability reports; and in 2013, 93 per
cent of the 250 largest global companies (G250) did so. Further, approximately 59 per
cent of these G250 ﬁrms engaged outside experts to independently assure these reports
(KPMG, 2013). Of course, this means that the remaining 41 per cent of these ﬁrms did
not seek outside auditing, and in a broader sample among the largest 100 companies
across 41 countries (4,100 companies) the rate of assurance is only 38 per cent. Further,
within the USA only 16 per cent of companies issued assured sustainability reports in
2013 (Environmental Leader, 2014). Since most nonﬁnancial reporting efforts are voluntary anyway, they paint a picture of inconsistent reporting that is of limited use to
investors and other stakeholders who are now or are considering engaging with a particular ﬁrm.
The view from a ﬁnancial reporting perspective is quite different. In the wake of corporate scandals and ﬁnancial stress, the US Government instituted new mandatory disclosure regulations, such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, that place more responsibility on
corporate leaders for ensuring the accuracy and completeness of ﬁnancial reporting, as
well as on auditors to ensure the credibility of these disclosures. The climate is right for
the public accounting profession to step up and institutionalize nonﬁnancial disclosures
similar to the manner in which ﬁnancial reporting disclosures have been institutionalized; that is, through accounting standard setting and assurance processes.
Unfortunately, the public accounting profession seems to be moving in the opposite
direction, as reﬂected by changes in the objectives of ﬁnancial reporting by the Financial
Accounting Standards Board (FASB). Speciﬁcally, FASB Statements No. 1 and 2 (issued
in 1978 and 1980 respectively) provided guidelines for the Conceptual Framework for
Financial Reporting that included responsibility to a broad group of stakeholders. These
guidelines were revised substantially in 2010 through the issuance of Statement of
Financial Accounting Concepts No. 8. Ernst & Young (FASB, 2010, p. 1) describe the
results of these revisions: ‘The revised Framework limits the range of addressees of general purpose ﬁnancial reporting. It lists as primary users of ﬁnancial statements, existing
or potential investors, lenders and other creditors. The existing [1978, 1980] Framework, in contrast, identiﬁed in addition to the addressees listed above, employees, suppliers, customers, governments and the general public’. As this description suggests, the
primary objective underlying current ﬁnancial reporting is to provide information that
is useful to investors and creditors, based on the premise that they need information that
will allow them to make rational investment decisions and ‘assess the prospects for future
net cash inﬂows to an entity’ (FASB 2010, Concepts Statement No. 8, OB3). Given that
the FASB is the organization responsible for establishing accounting and reporting
standards in the US, this premise becomes the foundation for ﬁnancial reporting.
This is a reasonable approach to help protect ﬁnancial investors; however, it disregards the fact that much more than operating capital is invested in a ﬁrm. Employees,
customers, suppliers and communities also provide essential resources to the ﬁrm, without which the ﬁrm would cease to exist (Freeman and Reed, 1983). Like ﬁnancial stakeholders, these stakeholders take risks when they invest in ﬁrms because their own
outcomes are directly affected by the activities of a ﬁrm (Clarkson, 1994). Similarly, they
need reliable information in order to assess what they might be expected to receive from
a ﬁrm in exchange for the resources they provide (Harrison et al., 2010). This paper
C 2015 John Wiley & Sons Ltd and Society for the Advancement of Management Studies
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argues that the public accounting profession has a responsibility to these stakeholders,
contrary to the recent actions of the FASB. We afﬁrm the call given to accounting
researchers by Moser and Martin (2012, p. 799) to consider a research perspective that
extends beyond the traditional shareholder view of the corporation, speciﬁcally with
regard to disclosures that ‘serve different or broader purposes than other traditional corporate ﬁnancial disclosures’.
The overriding objective of this paper is to provide a stronger theoretical and practical
rationale for integrating investor-focused ﬁnancial reporting principles with stakeholder
theory, which emphasizes recognition of multiple stakeholder interests. If we take a broad
perspective on ﬁrm value creation, and recognize that much of the value a ﬁrm creates
(or destroys) is nonﬁnancial (Harrison and Wicks, 2013), then it is also logical that ﬁrms
should measure and report nonﬁnancial results of their value creation processes. In addition to the beneﬁts to stakeholders from being better able to manage risks associated with
their investments of nonﬁnancial (as well as ﬁnancial) resources in a ﬁrm, new disclosures
of information pertinent to a broader group of stakeholders may have the added beneﬁt
of providing management with more tools to help sustain or build a successful strategy
(Freeman et al., 2007; Harrison and Wicks, 2013; Harrison et al., 2010).
It is important to create some boundaries for our paper from the outset. Global forces
are providing an impetus for broader stakeholder reporting; however, the complexity
associated with these forces, and the variability in rules and regulations pertaining to so
many different situations, are too vast to tackle in one paper. Thus, our emphasis is on
reporting in public corporations headquartered in the USA. We recognize that the
USA currently is not a leader in the reporting of corporate social responsibility or sustainability information (Kolk and Perego, 2010) and, in fact, is one of the most
shareholder-focused countries in the world (La Porta, et al., 1998; Stout, 2012). It is for
this reason that the public accounting profession in the USA is an excellent subject for
our arguments. We also acknowledge that changes in the US reporting system can have
implications for reporting elsewhere in the world. Ernst & Young (2012) published a
study comparing US Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), established by
the FASB, to International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), which are controlled
by the IASB. They observed that the Boards of the two organizations are continuing to
work together on speciﬁc convergence projects, evidence that what happens with US
guidelines and principles can have a broader impact over time. Further, many corporations headquartered in the USA have foreign subsidiaries, which provides another vehicle for inﬂuencing global reporting.
This paper is both theoretical and normative in that it challenges the conventional wisdom underlying current ﬁnancial reporting practices to embrace a stakeholder perspective. Herein we are integrating existing stakeholder theory with existing ﬁnancial and
accounting theory and applying a combined theoretical perspective to a reporting structure that is already partially in place, but is not uniformly or universally applied. We also
apply institutional theory as a lens for understanding the forces moving this reporting
institution forward – to predict that eventually the institution of public ﬁnancial accounting will be compelled to embrace the institutions developed around accounting for stakeholders, and that these institutions will converge. More than anything else, this paper
challenges the reversal of the public accounting profession regarding its responsibility to
C 2015 John Wiley & Sons Ltd and Society for the Advancement of Management Studies
V

938

J. S. Harrison and J. van der Laan Smith

provide nonﬁnancial resource-providing stakeholders with the information they need to
manage risks associated with their engagement with the ﬁrm. Our analyses demonstrate
that it is in the best interests of the accounting profession to embrace broader stakeholder
reporting sooner rather than later. Towards the end of the paper we also provide some
examples of existing measures that might serve as starting points for integration of
broader stakeholder-based measures into the domain of public accounting.
SHORTCOMINGS OF THE SHAREHOLDER-DOMINANT PERSPECTIVE
Darrell West (2011), director of Governance Studies and a senior fellow at Brookings,
examined law and business school curricula and student perceptions over a decade, and
found some results he considers ‘troubling’. Among his ﬁndings, he discovered that for
classes that deal with the purpose of the corporation, the focus is on maximizing shareholder value. He also found that after students complete school they are most likely to
consider shareholder value as the most important goal of the corporation, compared to
other possible goals such as employee welfare or satisfying customer needs. West’s ﬁndings are conﬁrmed in a new general management text by a major publisher: ‘Although
more managers are adopting a broader stakeholder approach to managing their ﬁrms,
the primary goal of the ﬁrm is still to maximize proﬁts, but to do so in an ethical and
responsible manner’ (Gulati et al., 2014, p. 92).
The current approach of the public accounting profession, which emphasizes the
responsibility of a ﬁrm to its suppliers of ﬁnancial capital, is justiﬁable on the basis of popular ﬁnancial theory (i.e., Brealey et al., 2003; Danielson et al., 2008; Jensen and Meckling,
1976). That is, the notion of shareholder primacy provides a rationale that is supportive of
current accounting standards and procedures. After all, if the corporation exists primarily
to generate returns for those who have provided the capital, then the focus in ﬁnancial
accounting on reporting for those stakeholders is justiﬁable. However, there are ﬂaws in
this argument, one of the greatest of which is that shareholders are the only stakeholders
that bear residual risk linked to outcomes from corporate activities (Easterbrook and
Fischel, 1991; Williamson, 1985). A broader stakeholder perspective suggests that many
stakeholders experience residual risk and that the leaders of corporations (top management
teams and directors) are responsible for protecting the interests of more residual risk
bearers than just the stockholders (Asher et al., 2005; Brink, 2010; Stout, 2012).
Agency theory also supports an emphasis on reporting for suppliers of ﬁnancial capital, and speciﬁcally shareholders. Consistent with some early thinking by Berle (1931)
that powers granted to a corporation’s managers should be exercised only for the beneﬁt
of the shareholders, Jensen and Meckling (1976) described corporate shareholders as
principals and top managers as agents with an obligation to seek their ﬁnancial interests
through all legal means. Any time a manager seeks another objective an agency cost
exists. Agency theory has become mainstream in the management literature (see Heath,
2009; Lan and Heracleaous, 2010). This theory underlies much of the accounting literature as well. For example, the two widely accepted reasons for external ﬁnancial reporting relate to shareholder risk assessment; they are to allow ‘capital providers
(shareholders and creditors) to evaluate the return potential of investment opportunities’
and ‘to monitor the use of their capital once committed’ (Beyer et al., 2010, p. 296).
C 2015 John Wiley & Sons Ltd and Society for the Advancement of Management Studies
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Although shareholder-primacy advocates use of the doctrine of implied contracts to
defend their position, this principle applies as well to other stakeholders (Boatright,
2002; MacLeod and Malcomson, 1989; Rousseau, 1995). As Hill and Jones (1992,
p. 134) argue, ‘Whatever the magnitude of their stake, each stakeholder is a part of the
nexus of implicit and explicit contracts that constitutes the ﬁrm’. Based on this perspective, Zingales (2000, p. 1634)[1] argued: ‘Once we recognize the existence of implicit
contracts, then there are other residual claimants besides equity holders who may need
to be protected (the famous stakeholders, often mentioned in the public policy debate).
It then becomes unclear whether control should reside in the hands of shareholders,
because the pursuit of shareholders’ value maximization may lead to inefﬁcient actions,
such as the breach of valuable implicit contracts. . .’.
In an interesting twist on this theme, Shleifer and Summers (1988) argue that
breaches of implicit and explicit contracts may provide a source of value to the shareholders of acquiring ﬁrms, particularly during hostile takeovers. The acquiring ﬁrm frequently makes decisions regarding pensions, employee retention, and long standing
arrangements with suppliers and customers that are inconsistent with the understandings
forged previously between these stakeholders and the managers of the acquired ﬁrm.
Cost savings can result, which are beneﬁcial to acquiring ﬁrm shareholders. This argument is an unambiguous admission of the implicit contracts corporations have to their
stakeholders (see also Asher et al., 2005).
It is worth noting that the agent/principal relationship found in agency theory relies
also on an assumption that shareholders are the owners of the ﬁrm. However, if a shareholder were really an owner, then he/she would have power to make decisions for the
ﬁrm and to lay claim to its assets (i.e., walk in and remove furniture or products). The
reality is that shareholders own shares of stock in a corporation, and the corporation is a
separate legal entity, just like a person (Stout, 2012). Directors and managers make decisions on how the proﬁts, if there are any, will be distributed. Some ﬁrms pay dividends
to shareholders and others reinvest all surpluses in new technologies and equipment,
while other ﬁrms may provide a bonus to employees. In this sense, all of the resourceproviding stakeholders in a ﬁrm experience residual risk, and they all receive a share of
any surplus proﬁts only at the discretion of managers, who are overseen by directors.
As Marens and Wicks (1999) observe, some also claim a legal precedent to the concept of shareholder primacy (see also Stout, 2002). That is, they claim the law obligates
directors to maximize shareholder wealth. Reporters and academicians, among others,
commonly make this assertion (Adams and Whelan, 2009; Stout, 2012). The editor of
Business Ethics even went so far as to argue that directors who do not work to maximize
shareholder returns can be sued (Kelly, 2001). Nevertheless, the idea that the law
requires directors and executives to maximize shareholder wealth is simply untrue
(Marens and Wicks, 1999). Stout (2012) explains that this false notion is, in part, a result
of misinterpretation of a judicial opinion by the Michigan Supreme Court in 1919 that
really had little to do with the purpose of public corporations as they are now constituted. In fact, the most widely cited statement from that case in support of shareholder
primacy was part of the ‘dicta’, a tangential observation that has not been validated by
Delaware’s courts, where many corporations are formed. In fact, the Delaware Supreme
Court issued a 1985 opinion that directors can consider other stakeholder interests
C 2015 John Wiley & Sons Ltd and Society for the Advancement of Management Studies
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(customers, employees, the community, and creditors) when considering the merits of a
business transaction (Stout, 2012). The courts allow directors substantial leeway in considering what is in the best interests of the ﬁrm through what is called ‘the business judgment rule’ (Orts, 1992).
Another irony associated with the shareholder primacy perspective is that attempts
alone to maximize shareholder returns may be unlikely to do so (Freeman et al., 2010).
Even the shareholder advocate Michael Jensen (2001, p. 298) admits this when he says
very clearly, ‘A ﬁrm cannot maximize value if it ignores the interest of its stakeholders’.
In another article, Jensen (2002, p. 245) also suggests, ‘We can learn from the stakeholder theorists how to lead managers and participants in an organization to think more
generally and creatively about how the organization’s policies treat all important constituencies of the ﬁrm. This includes not just ﬁnancial markets, but employees, customers,
suppliers, the community in which the organization exists, and so on’.
At a practical level, the shareholder primacy perspective has been associated with
negative outcomes for ﬁrms, their stakeholders and society. For instance, Cloninger
(1995, p. 50) observed that, ‘In the presence of asymmetric information, the avid pursuit of share price maximization may lead managers to violate certain stakeholder
interests and employ business practices that are unethical, immoral, or illegal’. Evidence of shareholder primacy in business organizations, and ensuing problems, is also
found anecdotally. In an extreme case, several decades ago managers at Manville
(then Johns-Manville) received information that asbestos inhalation was associated
with lung disease. Manville suppressed the information and continued with production. They even concealed chest X-rays from their employees. In the aftermath of this
scandal, a Manville lawyer was quoted as saying that in the interest of making a proﬁt
the company would let employees work until they dropped dead (Gellerman, 1986).
More recently, the BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico was traced back to several decisions made by BP employees and contractors to ignore safety procedures in an effort
to cut costs (National Commission, 2011). If we believe that if values such as those
found among graduating business students actually translate into concrete behaviours,
then it is also logical to expect that on a smaller scale, and thus in less detectable
situations, decisions of this nature are presumably made on a regular basis.
The arguments contained in this section lead us to a discussion of stakeholder theory
as a more defensible perspective on the question of to whom the corporation is responsible and to whom it should be reporting.
RESPONSIBILITY TO STAKEHOLDERS
In a broad sense, stakeholders are groups and individuals that have an interest in the
activities and outcomes of a ﬁrm and upon whom the ﬁrm depends in order to achieve
its own objectives (Freeman, 1984; Freeman et al., 2007). For reporting purposes, we
are most interested in those stakeholders that are affected by ﬁrm actions. It is these stakeholders that provide the resources either explicitly (e.g., shareholders and employees), or
implicitly (e.g., communities, that allow the ﬁrm to exist and create value). Stakeholder
theory makes a ﬁrm responsible to multiple stakeholders based on both normative and
instrumental grounds (Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Jones, 1995). In other words, a
C 2015 John Wiley & Sons Ltd and Society for the Advancement of Management Studies
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ﬁrm should look after the interests of its stakeholders because it is the right thing to do
and because it is the means through which the ﬁrm can create more value.
This latter notion that a stakeholder-based management approach creates more value
has received empirical support from studies that demonstrate higher performance for
these types of ﬁrms (Berman et al., 1999; Choi and Wang, 2009; Freeman et al., 2010;
Hillman and Keim, 2001; Orlitzky et al., 2003; Preston and Sapienza, 1990; Sisodia
et al., 2007; Waddock and Graves, 1997). Much of the empirical accounting research in
this area has focused on how corporate responsibility reporting beneﬁts shareholders
through more informative disclosures, lower cost of capital and higher quality earnings
(Dhaliwal et al., 2012; Kim et al., 2012). The notion is also supported in practice, with
over one third of the G250 companies reporting improved ﬁnancial performance as a
result of their corporate responsibility programmes (KPMG, 2013). Nonetheless, it is
not our purpose in this paper to advocate for broader stakeholder reporting on instrumental grounds. Instead, we return to the normative foundation upon which shareholder primacy is based, and discover that it ﬁts nicely with a broader stakeholder
perspective.
We mentioned in the introduction that the stakeholders to whom we believe the public accounting profession should be responsible are those that provide important resources to the ﬁrm’s value creating processes, which include investors of ﬁnancial capital,
employees, suppliers, customers and communities. The ideas of residual claims and
implied contracts found in the shareholder primacy literature can be extended to
include this broader group of stakeholders (Marens and Wicks, 1999; Stout, 2012;
Zingales, 2000). For example, employees bear residual risk in the sense that their fortunes are intertwined with the fortunes of the company, and many employees have
made speciﬁc investments in an organization that have no market value outside of that
organization (Blair, 1995). Also, if the company is making a solid proﬁt, then their own
salaries, beneﬁts and working conditions are expected to improve. This is an implicit
contract, and if a ﬁrm is prospering and not sharing its spoils through better treatment
of employees, however deﬁned, there are likely to be ramiﬁcations in terms of employee
behaviour (Bosse et al., 2009; Donaldson and Dunfee, 2000; Phillips and JohnsonCramer, 2006; Simon, 1966). The ﬁrm similarly establishes implicit contracts with all of
the stakeholders that are part of the core production function of the ﬁrm.
Adding to the concepts of residual claims and implied contracts is the principle of fairness (Phillips, 1997, 2003), which suggests that stakeholders should be given merit based
on the extent of their contributions of resources to the ﬁrm. Similarly, Clarkson (1994)
suggests that stakeholders should be identiﬁed as such only if they bear some form of
risk from a ﬁrm’s activities, most often because they have contributed something of
value. These are the stakeholders to whom the ﬁrm might be expected to provide information that will allow them to protect their investments through making better risk
assessments. Our emphasis, then, puts highest priority on stakeholders that bear the
highest risks through their investments in the ﬁrm, consistent with the residual claims,
implied contracts, and fairness arguments. Our normative argument, from an external reporting
perspective, is that non-ﬁnancial stakeholder groups that contribute signiﬁcant resources to the corporation
are as worthy of receiving reliable information (on a regular basis) that will help them to mitigate their
risks (residual and otherwise) as are those stakeholder groups that supply ﬁnancial capital to the ﬁrm.
C 2015 John Wiley & Sons Ltd and Society for the Advancement of Management Studies
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Current ‘Stakeholder’ Reporting
As Freeman (1984) stated and reafﬁrmed in Freeman, et al. (2010), stakeholder theory is
not about social responsibility. It is about creating value through efﬁcient and effective
management in an increasingly complex and turbulent business world (Freeman et al.,
2007). By extension, creating value is at variance with creating negative externalities.
Thus, a ﬁrm that is spewing large amounts of dangerous waste into its surrounding communities is creating less value with regard to those communities. Similarly, a ﬁrm that is
producing dangerous products (to save money) is likely to be found out eventually and
the ﬂow of resources from customers (sales) would be expected to decline. This logic
applies to all stakeholder groups that provide resources to the ﬁrm. Stakeholder theory
suggests that eventually value-lessening behaviour causes problems as stakeholders cease
to provide resources necessary to create value (Harrison and Wicks, 2013). So although
stakeholder theory is not corporate social responsibility theory, we believe that when
viewed in light of their potential for adding value to the ﬁrm, the two concepts are sufﬁciently congruous to arrive at similar conclusions, at least with regard to stakeholder
reporting. That is, a ‘stakeholder oriented’ or a ‘socially responsible’ ﬁrm has a responsibility to provide accurate reporting to a broader group of stakeholders than just ﬁnancial
investors, because these additional stakeholders also bear residual risk associated with
value creation.
Stakeholder theory has primarily been used in the accounting literature within sustainability reporting research as a theoretical framework to identify those stakeholders
who are engaged with a corporation (Boesso and Kumar, 2007; Gray et al., 1995;
Prado-Lorenzo et al., 2009; van der Laan Smith et al., 2005). However, within this literature, the theory has been criticized for not addressing how an organization should monitor and respond to the needs of stakeholders (Gray et al., 1997). From a stakeholder
perspective, current ﬁnancial reporting is important because ﬁnancial ﬁgures are relevant to all of the stakeholders that provide resources to the ﬁrm and consequently bear
residual risk; but as we have argued, current reporting is insufﬁcient (Harrison and
Wicks, 2013). We therefore turn to a discussion of the needed improvements in sustainability reporting that can more effectively address the needs of all bearers of residual
risk.
Additional Possibilities for Sustainability Reporting
Sustainability reporting is currently increasing in popularity, and the majority of the
largest global corporations engage in such reporting (Kolk, 2003, 2010; KPMG, 2013).
The sustainability premise is that ﬁrms should engage in business in such a manner that
they do not deplete the resources necessary to engage in their business in the future (Perego and Kolk, 2012). For example, Royal Dutch Shell publishes an annual sustainability
report that covers topics such as sustainability principles, safety, environmental impact,
and how sustainable development is integrated into the company’s business strategies
(Royal Dutch Shell, 2012). Other ﬁrms create reports that deal speciﬁcally with outcomes important to particular stakeholders. But there are difﬁculties.
Research indicates that much of the information currently reported through sustainability reports is ‘not material, not assured, not measured, not aggregate information,
C 2015 John Wiley & Sons Ltd and Society for the Advancement of Management Studies
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not comparable with other organisations and, presenting a favorable view rather than a
realistic view of the organisation’s performance’ (Hubbard, 2009, p. 15). Also, corporate
sustainability statements may lack credibility due to the possibility of ulterior purpose,
thereby being dismissed: as part of a broad public relations effort (Freeman and Auster,
2011; Liedtka, 2008) or as a response to public pressure (Patten, 1995). Furthermore,
studies on the content of sustainability reports observe signiﬁcant cross-national differences in the level and quality of corporate social disclosure (Gamble et al., 1996; Meek
et al., 1995; van der Laan Smith et al., 2005; Williams and Pei, 1999; Zarzeski, 1996).
Each of these difﬁculties limits the effectiveness of accounting and reporting for the beneﬁt of all residual-risk-bearing stakeholders.
Like external ﬁnancial reports, independent audits of sustainability reports provide
credibility to the reporting process and improve ﬁrm value through enhanced corporate
reputation (Simnett et al., 2009). However, in a study of organizational accountability
for sustainability in G250 ﬁrms over a ten-year period, Perego and Kolk (2012) found
great variability in the adoption of assurance practices. Also, while we stated in the
introduction that almost 60 percent of the G250 companies have their sustainability
information assured, less than 40 per cent of the largest 100 companies across 41 countries do so (KPMG, 2013). Within the USA the number of companies electing to have
their sustainability reports assured is even lower, with only 16 per cent of US companies
issuing assured sustainability reports in 2013 (Environmental Leader, 2014). Also, the
majority of sustainability audits both within the USA and globally still only provide limited levels of assurance (Perego and Kolk, 2012).
One of the primary concerns that auditors have with the assurance process for sustainability reports is that, unlike external ﬁnancial reporting, there are no sustainability
criteria or standards that have been generally accepted by a regulatory authority (Ballou
et al., 2006; Perego and Kolk, 2012; Simnett et al., 2009). The lack of accepted metrics
makes it difﬁcult to obtain the assurance necessary to develop an opinion on the quality
of the entire report. This typically results in sustainability reports that are audited only
on very speciﬁc measures, providing limited usefulness to stakeholders (Peters and
Romi, 2015). Again, these arguments support the argument that the public accounting
profession should take more responsibility to ensure more consistent reporting for nonﬁnancial stakeholders. Using the previous sections as a foundation, we will now examine
the present and future of accounting for stakeholders using explanations offered by institutional theory.
THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF ACCOUNTING
FOR STAKEHOLDERS
Institutional theory is helpful in explaining the current situation with regard to both public ﬁnancial and stakeholder accounting, and in predicting what will happen to these two
institutions in the future. DiMaggio and Powell (1983, p. 148) argue that organizations
tend to become homogenous within particular areas ‘that, in the aggregate, constitute a
recognized area of institutional life’. Institutions are reﬂected by norms, rules, policies,
structures and behaviours of members of organizational ﬁelds, such as professions. We
will consider public ﬁnancial and stakeholder reporting institutions separately because of
C 2015 John Wiley & Sons Ltd and Society for the Advancement of Management Studies
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the recent steps the public accounting profession has taken to limit its responsibility for
broader stakeholder reporting; although we acknowledge that many accounting ﬁrms
participate in both institutional ﬁelds. In fact, as we will argue an eventual convergence
of the two institutions either voluntarily or through coercion appears to be likely.
Building on the concept of isomorphism, a constraining process that causes one
unit in an institutional ﬁeld to become increasingly more like other units in that ﬁeld,
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) suggest three mechanisms of institutional isomorphic
change: coercive, mimetic, and normative isomorphism. Coercive isomorphism results
from informal and formal pressures exerted by organizations on other organizations
that depend on them, and from cultural expectations within society (1983, p. 150).
Mimetic isomorphic processes involve imitation of one organization by other organizations as a response to uncertainty (when organizational technologies are poorly understood, when goals are ambiguous, or when the environment creates symbolic
uncertainty); basically, modeling themselves on other organizations within an institutional ﬁeld rather than trying new things themselves (1983, p. 151). Normative pressures
that lead to isomorphic organizational change are suggested to come from widely held
norms of conduct that stem from professionalization – the collective struggle of members
of an occupation to deﬁne the conditions and methods of their work: expectations
regarding how ﬁrms and individuals within a particular profession will behave (1983, p.
152). Clearly, institutional theory would argue that norms and normative pressures will
have a strong inﬂuence on behaviour in the accounting institution.
Analysis of Present Institutions
To understand better how isomorphic mechanisms inﬂuence the institution of public
ﬁnancial accounting, we will examine relationships among some of its key stakeholders
relative to the three types of isomorphic pressure previously outlined. The FASB holds a
central position in the institution of public ﬁnancial accounting in the USA because it
negotiates, records and promulgates the policies, practices and rules followed by the
public accounting profession. Consequently, the FASB has normative power with regard
to the American Institute of Certiﬁed Public Accountants (AICPA) and with regard to
accountants in general. However, there is also much evidence of coercive political pressure on the FASB, including direct lobbying and indirect lobbying to inﬂuence the
FASB through the SEC and through political representatives (i.e., Koh 2011;
K€
onigsberger 2010; Zeff 2005a,b).
Public accountants and public accounting ﬁrms, whose interests are represented by
the AICPA, also have coercive power because they are a major lobbying group and
they are also the primary ‘customer’ of the FASB. Of course, the SEC has coercive
power over the FASB because they have charged the FASB to establish ﬁnancial
accounting and reporting standards in the public’s best interests (which, we note, also
reinforces society as a stakeholder). The investment community and the legal community are also key coercive stakeholders, which often work together to exert informal and
formal pressure on the FASB as an organization that depends on them. We suggest that
other standard-setting organizations such as the IASB and GRI are stakeholders primarily through normative and mimetic forces. Corporations, as customers of the public
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accounting profession, are also stakeholders within the institutional ﬁeld of public
accounting, and in this role have in the past exerted both coercive and normative isomorphic pressures on the FASB. There are other stakeholders, of course, but these
appear to be most inﬂuential in terms of isomorphic pressure.
By deﬁnition, as members of an institutional ﬁeld, the interests of these stakeholders
are interconnected, and societal inﬂuences are represented through the actions of special
interest groups, the legal community, corporate leaders, politicians, the media, and
other forms of pressure (i.e., Campbell, 2007). There is substantial evidence that society
would prefer broader stakeholder reporting, as reﬂected by demand for such information from groups such as Ceres, representing over 100 major institutional investors, who
recently released a proposal recommending integrating disclosures on environmental
and social issues into stock exchange listing rules (Ceres, 2014). Also, the growing number of organizations working to provide this sort of information include Bloomberg, that
added environmental, social and governance data to its terminals in 2009 (Bloomberg,
2014). Since the SEC holds coercive power over the FASB, with responsibility for the
public interest, and societal expectations are also coercive in nature (DiMaggio and
Powell, 1983), the FASB would be expected to move in the direction of providing what
society wants. Such is not the case, at least at present. What might explain this
contradiction?
Of the stakeholders mentioned, we have argued that the SEC has the greatest coercive power over the FASB. However, we have also argued that the AICPA and the legal
community also have tremendous inﬂuence, as was manifest, for example, in the takedown of Arthur Andersen after the Enron scandal. In fact, we believe the Enron/Arthur
Andersen incident gave the legal community more salience to and coercive inﬂuence
over the public accounting profession than it had previously because of its display of
power (see Mitchell et al., 1997 for clariﬁcation of the salience construct). This logic suggests that the public accounting profession as normed by the FASB (and thus the
AICPA) may have become more risk averse, thus less willing to take on broader responsibilities for new areas of accounting such as sustainability accounting speciﬁcally and
accounting for stakeholders more generally, especially since the contents of these
accounts are likely to be more difﬁcult to measure. In addition, widely accepted ﬁnancial
theory favouring shareholder dominance, whether appropriate or not to the needs of
society at large, provides legitimacy to the current tighter focus of the ﬁnancial accounting institution on reporting only for the beneﬁt of investors and creditors. We note that
this shareholder-dominance view is also likely to be manifest in the response of managers
of the publically-reporting corporations the accounting profession serves; and thus many
such managers would also be expected to resist new reporting requirements because of
their expense.
In the past, the societal stakeholder has become more salient due to urgency resulting
from some crisis or other, such as the creation of Sarbanes-Oxley in the aftermath of the
ﬁnancial crisis. However, it is difﬁcult to imagine what sort of crisis it might take for the
AICPA and FASB to give enough salience to society and other corporate stakeholders
as unrecognized holders of residual risk to cause them to embrace the creation of new
standards for stakeholder reporting. We suggest that the international movement
towards broader reporting might be better described as a groundswell than as the kind
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of crisis that might reshape current institutional pressures to enable stakeholder accounting standards to become institutionalized. However, there is another institutionally
based force that may still accomplish such a change in direction, which we now suggest.
Analysis of a Possible Future Institution
As we suggested previously, another reporting institution is rapidly emerging, which we
suggest should be made more theoretically explicit, and which we call the institution of
accounting for stakeholders. For several reasons the institution of accounting for stakeholders that we conceptualize is more responsive to current societal forces.
Lawrence et al. (2001), who theorize concerning the temporal dynamics of institutionalization, have described several stages that an institution passes through before it
becomes stabilized: innovation, diffusion, and legitimation (2001, p. 626). We argue that
the institution of accounting for stakeholders has moved beyond the innovation stage, in
which a few organizations established early standards for stakeholder reporting, and is
now in the diffusion stage, as exempliﬁed by broader application and acceptance of
stakeholder reporting (sustainability reporting being the exemplar used to introduce our
paper). We suggest that the diffusion stage has been accelerated by public outcry and
pressure by special interest groups and the media, as well as by investors who would like
to receive this information (e.g., socially conscious investors, managers of social investment funds). We further suggest that the institution of accounting for stakeholders is
gradually moving towards the legitimation stage, in which stakeholder reporting will
have achieved full acceptance. Lawrence et al. (2001, pp. 632, 634) further argue that
the pace and stability of institutionalization are affected by a variety of mechanisms that
include: both episodic (force or inﬂuence) and systemic (domination or discipline). The
above analysis that we have reported herein suggests that both inﬂuence (normative and
coercive pressures within the USA) and discipline (mimetic international pressures) are
likely to combine to result in a medium pace/high stability institution in the future of
accounting for stakeholders. We have reason to expect this to be within the realm of
possibility.
At the ﬁrm level, some argue that social and environmental accounting has already
become a legitimate institution (Contrafatto, in press), and corporations may feel compelled to disclose stakeholder information because of its legitimizing effect (Deegan,
2002). Also, the steady diffusion of the institution of stakeholder reporting, as reﬂected
by the myriad organizations involved in sustainability reporting (our example), and the
increase in voluntary disclosures by corporations, can be thought of as somewhat of a
threat to the current public accounting institution and as inﬂuence toward the stakeholder accounting institution. Even the existence of this Special Issue in a highly prominent management journal suggests that legitimation is underway. The idea that the
stakeholder accounting institution might be considered a feasible threat to the public
ﬁnancial accounting institution can be explained from two perspectives: normative and
coercive socio-political pressures; and mimetic and normative pressures.
Normative and coercive socio-political pressures. First, it is possible that the social and political
forces that are shaping accounting for stakeholders might also ‘catch up’ with the
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institution of ﬁnancial accounting. Research indicates that stakeholders can inﬂuence
the way ﬁrms measure performance (Rodrigue et al., 2013), and even the establishment
of reporting standards such as the development of ISO 26000 (Balzarova and Castka,
2012). Will the public accounting profession be able to hold to its position that its salient
stakeholders for reporting purposes are primarily the investors and creditors, or will it
be forced to reverse its position again due to normative and coercive isomorphism manifest through social, political and stakeholder forces that demand reporting to the
broader set of residual-risk stakeholders? As stakeholder accounting continues its path
toward full legitimacy through social acceptance and desirability, the SEC itself might
eventually respond to social pressures and coerce the FASB and thus the public accounting profession to conform.
As an illustration of this sort of coercion, for purposes of at least arguing practicality,
the FASB itself was established in 1973 as a result of public and US Government concerns over the independence of the previous standard setting body, which was a part of
the AICPA. Later in the 1970s, as a result of public pressure arising from the Penn Central Company bankruptcy, the US Senate’s Metcalf committee expressed concern over
the independence of accountants and the quality of audits. This resulted in the AICPA
establishing a self-regulatory group, the Public Oversight Board, to conduct peer
reviews of audits. However, the public outcry in the aftermath of the Enron and Worldcom bankruptcies led to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which pulled the review of
audits from the AICPA and established the Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board (PCAOB). In testimony before the Senate Banking Committee, Charles Bowsher,
then chairman of the Public Oversight Board, stated that the self-regulatory programme
had failed primarily as a result of the resistance of the AICPA to reform (Bowsher,
2002). Therefore we observe that if the public accounting profession does not respond
to societal pressures on its own, the pressures extant in the institutional ﬁeld of public
accounting may lead to the opening of new hearings by the US. Government.
Mimetic and normative pressures. Second, if the public accounting profession waits, other
organizations involved in the institution of accounting for stakeholders will have time to
establish strongly institutionalized, more uniform standards for stakeholder reporting
through mimetic processes and normative pressures. If the US Government, for example, due to societal and political pressures as just noted, should eventually compel the
FASB (through the SEC) to adopt a broader perspective on reporting, the FASB would
feel pressure to accept the stakeholder reporting institutions that have already been
established. This would severely erode their leadership position in the setting of standards and their ability to create a set of institutions that are most appealing to accounting
professionals in the US. In this regard, Campbell (2007) suggests that regulations and
enforcement capacities are more effective if developed voluntarily through negotiation
and consensus rather than by government mandate.
Eventually, we predict that isomorphic inﬂuences will cause the institution of public
ﬁnancial accounting and the institution of accounting for stakeholders to converge. Support for this theoretical assertion is found in the fact, mentioned previously, that many
public accounting ﬁrms are already involved in accounting for stakeholders. For example, each of the Big 4 accounting ﬁrms have separate, deﬁned service groups providing
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client support for sustainability and climate change initiatives and reporting. Also, at
some point threat of government intervention is likely to motivate their convergence
(Campbell, 2007). Basically, at least according to the predictions of the institutional
theory we have applied to accounting for stakeholders, the FASB and AICPA can now
decide whether they want to be leaders or followers during the convergence process.
Practical Considerations
Our analysis based on institutional theory suggests that if the public accounting profession does not take action to broaden its reporting requirements to serve more stakeholders, isomorphic forces may compel them to do so, and they could also lose their
preeminent leadership position in the reporting profession as a result. However, there
are also some practical reasons that the FASB is the best-suited organization to take on
the challenge of moving the institution of public accounting from a primarily reactive
one to one of proactivity. For example, efﬁciency would seem to be a major consideration, since both public accountants and members of the stakeholder-based reporting
institution are obtaining information from many of the same organizations. Would it
not be more efﬁcient, from a societal perspective, for the same institution to run both
processes? Also, the FASB would enjoy a legitimacy advantage compared to other
standard setting agencies.
Another practical consideration is to consider who else might take on the initiative to
standardize reporting for a broad group of residual-risk stakeholders. The three most
reasonable candidates would seem to be the US Government, the IASB, and the GRI.
With regard to the US Government, the SEC has the authority to require expanded disclosure of a company’s practices with regard to environmental and social issues (Williams, 1999). However, the reality is that political gridlock among government leaders
often makes such a bold move unlikely within a short-term time horizon. Looking at the
second candidate, the IASB does not yet have enforcement power; and their standards
are not permitted to be used by US based companies for securities listings in the US.
Finally, at this point in time at least, the GRI cannot require uniform standards, nor
does it have enforcement authority.
We therefore argue that now is an appropriate time to expand the purpose of external reporting because there is so much momentum behind voluntary reporting (Kolk
and Perego, 2010; Perego and Kolk, 2012) and, as a result of so many scandals, layoffs,
bankruptcies, broken promises, environmental concerns, and corruption, society as a
whole is demanding better and broader reporting. Governments and stock exchanges
have begun requiring reporting on sustainability issues (KPMG, 2013) and support for
environmental and social shareholder resolutions reached over 21 per cent for the ﬁrst
time in 2013 (Institutional Shareholder Services, 2014). The public accounting profession is in the unique position of having the experience and clout to pull together and
standardize measurement and communication standards and processes that are currently widely distributed in a large number of third-party organizations, and to do so in
a way that makes sense for corporations and their stakeholders.
Nonetheless, while the timing may be right from a societal perspective, we acknowledge that such a move will not be without controversy, and may actually take some time
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to accomplish. Consider the case of the costs of disposing of a physical asset at the end
of its useful life, such as a nuclear power plant. Prior to 2002, there were a variety of
ways of accounting for these costs, referred to as asset retirement obligations, ranging
from no recognition to treatment as a depreciation expense. In 2001, the FASB issued a
standard requiring consistent measurement, recognition and disclosure of these estimated, future costs even in cases where there may be no explicit contract obligating the
ﬁrm to incur disposal costs. While controversial at the time, this standard is now
accepted practice. We believe that beginning now to develop the procedures and practices for effective accounting for residual-risk stakeholders, if implemented, will also generate controversy in the short term (cf. Agle et al., 2008), but that they are both sorely
needed and inevitable.
AN EXPANDED PURPOSE FOR PUBLIC ACCOUNTING
Based on the logic and arguments found in previous sections of this paper, we propose
an expansion of the traditional role of external ﬁnancial reporting to include measurement and communication of information that is relevant to stakeholders that provide
important resources to the ﬁrm, with the purpose of allowing them to make better judgments with regard to the residual risks they face through engagement with a corporation. This information might be provided with currently required ﬁnancial reports or in
separate reports, much like the sustainability reports currently produced by many corporations. The difference, of course, is that these new reports would be based on uniform
reporting standards and would be audited. We suggest such development to be practical
and consistent with past practice.
Over time, accounting disclosures have developed to meet the information needs of
ﬁnancial statement users. Since capital providers have been deﬁned as the primary users
of ﬁnancial statements, much of the disclosure literature has focused on the information
asymmetry between investors and managers (Healy and Palepu, 2001). Applying the
existing ﬁnancial disclosure research and models to a broader set of ﬁnancial statement
users provides a framework for understanding the information needs of these users (See
Beyer et al., 2010; Healy and Palepu, 2001). For example, Dye’s (1998, 2001, p. 218)
disclosure model predicts ‘as the probability that investors are sophisticated increases, a
seller’s propensity for making disclosures also increases’. Dye’s example of this prediction is the disclosure of environmental liabilities that were not disclosed when investors
were not aware of the issue. As the ‘climate’ changed and investors became more interested ﬁrms had a higher propensity to disclose this information. Disclosure of environmental liabilities is now a part of GAAP, as would have been predicted by institutional
theory. The growth and level of sustainability reporting indicates that stakeholders are
interested in this information and, as Dye’s model predicts, companies are providing it.
However, they are not yet doing so in a reliable and comparable form.
We argue that corporations should have an independent auditor provide assurance
that they are adhering to standards for stakeholder-based reporting, providing an additional layer of credibility to the reporting process. Audited reports may not be, nor do
they claim to be, free from errors; however, they provide a level of credibility that is
absent from non-audited information (Neu et al., 1998). The additional assurance
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provided to ﬁnancial statement users is the primary reason given for the SEC’s requirement that publically listed companies provide audited ﬁnancial statements (www.SEC.
gov). This logic can be extended to broader stakeholder-based reporting.
The FASB has already deﬁned the characteristics of information that allow it to be
useful, identifying relevance and faithful representation as ‘fundamental qualitative
characteristics’ (FASB 2010, Concepts Statement No. 8). Information is relevant if it
makes a difference in a decision; that is, it must have predictive or feedback value. Information provides a faithful representation if it measures what it purports to measure.
Within this information framework the FASB establishes the accounting standards
required to be used by all US entities (see Hail et al., 2010) for a discussion of the role of
accounting standards). Fortunately, the public accounting profession has experience
reporting on issues that are not purely ﬁnancial. For example, the notes associated with
external ﬁnancial reports must include a discussion of risk factors (FASB 2014, Accounting Standards Codiﬁcation 275), pending lawsuits (FASB 2014, ASC 450), large contracts (FASB 2014, ASC 280), dependence on large customers (FASB 2014, ASC 280),
disclosures related to climate change (SEC 2010, Release No. 33-9106), and so forth.
There is also a deep and broad body of accounting literature examining the properties of the external reporting environment (Beyer et al., 2010; Healy and Palepu, 2001).
Building on this knowledge provides a basis from which to develop stakeholder reporting practices. Although length constraints prevent us from full elaboration in this regard,
we would like to at least provide a few examples of the kinds of measures stakeholders
might ﬁnd useful (see Table I). Our examples focus on evaluation of the risks of engaging with an organization, although stakeholders might also use such information to help
determine the value they might expect to receive. We recognize also that a static system,
universally applied, would be problematic. We suggest that ﬂexibility in what is reported
across various industries will be necessary. Also, reporting practices will need to be
examined regularly and revised based on current conditions, learning processes, and
evolving stakeholder information needs.
The second column of Table I contains examples of the types of risk factors various
stakeholders face when they consider engaging or continuing to engage with a ﬁrm. For
example, an employee who is considering working for a company faces risk of termination (or voluntary turnover), discrimination, and poor or dangerous working conditions,
among other things. In the job interview, the company may say that they have excellent
and safe working conditions and that people seldom leave the ﬁrm, while these statements may not be entirely accurate. If a ﬁrm has to report on things like turnover by
level and injury rates or sick days by type of work, then prospective employees can better
assess their risks.
Similarly, customers and potential customers are inﬂuenced by public advertising and
direct communications from the ﬁrm. However, if ﬁrms are required to report on things
like return rates then they will be able to make a better assessment of the risks associated
with buying a product from a particular company. Examples like these are available for
all of the stakeholders that contribute important resources to the ﬁrm. Notice in the
third column of Table I that there are easily available measures and that shareholders
have much more information available to them (by ﬁnancial reporting mandate) to
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-Quality policies/procedures and implementation
processes
-Return rates
-Customer legal suits pending and settleda
-Customer satisfaction

-Termination
-Discrimination
-Poor working
conditions
-Dangerous
working
conditions

-Poor product
quality
-Injury

Employees or
potential
employees

Customers or
potential
customers

G4-LA6
TYPE OF INJURY AND RATES OF INJURY,
OCCUPATIONAL DISEASES, LOST DAYS,
AND ABSENTEEISM, AND TOTAL NUMBER
OF WORK-RELATED FATALITIES, BY
REGION AND BY GENDER
a. Report types of injury, injury rate (IR), occupational
diseases rate (ODR), lost day rate (LDR), absentee rate
(AR) and work-related fatalities, for the total workforce
(that is, total employees plus supervised workers), by:
Region
Gender
b. Report types of injury, injury rate (IR), occupational
diseases rate (ODR), lost day rate (LDR), absentee rate
(AR) and work-related fatalities for independent contractors working on-site to whom the organization is liable
for the general safety of the working environment, by:
Region
Gender
c. Report the system of rules applied in recording and
reporting accident statistics.
G4-PR5
RESULTS OF SURVEYS MEASURING
CUSTOMER SATISFACTION
a. Report the results or key conclusions of customer
satisfaction surveys (based on statistically relevant sample sizes) conducted in the reporting period relating to
information about:
The organization as a whole
A major product or service category
Signiﬁcant locations of operation

-Annual turnover by level (hourly, salaried, management) and type (voluntary, non-voluntary)
-Workforce characteristics in terms of race, sex,
national origin, age, by level
-Workplace policies and methods of enforcement
-Injury rates and average sick days by type of work
(manual labour, administrative)
-Employee legal suits pending and settleda

Risk factor

Stakeholder

Global Reporting InitiativeTM
Examples of G4-sustainability reporting guidelines

Measures based on data already collected internally by many
organizations

Table I. Examples of stakeholder risk factors, easily obtained measures and Global Reporting InitiativeTM
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Risk factor

-Agency
problems
-Inaccurate
ﬁnancial
reports/theft
-Business risks
-Systematic risk

-Water usage
-Pollution
-Business disruptions/loss of
jobs
-Negative
impact from
growth

Stakeholder

Shareholders or
potential
shareholders

Communities

Table I. Continued

G4-38
a. Report the composition of the highest governance
body and its committees by:
Executive or non-executive
Independence
Tenure on the governance body
Number of each individual’s other signiﬁcant
positions and commitments, and the nature of the
commitments
Gender
Membership of under-represented social groups
Competences relating to economic, environmental
and social impacts
Stakeholder representation
G4-EN8
TOTAL WATER WITHDRAWAL BY SOURCE
a. Report the total volume of water withdrawn from
the following sources:
Surface water, including water from wetlands, rivers, lakes, and oceans
Ground water
Rainwater collected directly and stored by the
organization
Waste water from another organization
Municipal water supplies or other water utilities
b. Report standards, methodologies, and assumptions
used.

-Board independencea
-Ownership holdings by top managers and directorsa
-Top manager compensation and policiesa
-Shareholder proposalsa
-Compliance with standard ﬁnancial reporting
proceduresa
-Disclosure of major business risksa
-Betaa
-Percentage of new R&D projects

-Measures of water usage
-Measures of carbon and non-carbon emissions and
waste
-Disclosure of percent of workforce overseas and fair
warning (2 years) of plans to outsource to other
geographic locations
-Policies regarding actions to mitigate negative externalities (beyond pollution) and implementation of
policies

Global Reporting InitiativeTM
Examples of G4-sustainability reporting guidelines

Measures based on data already collected internally by many
organizations
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-Late payments
-Opportunism
-Contractual
discrimination

Suppliers

Global Reporting InitiativeTM
Examples of G4-sustainability reporting guidelines
G4-EC9
PROPORTION OF SPENDING ON LOCAL
SUPPLIERS AT SIGNIFICANT LOCATIONS OF
OPERATION
a. Report the percentage of the procurement budget
used for signiﬁcant locations of operation spent on
suppliers local to that operation (such as percentage of
products and services purchased locally).
b. Report the organization’s geographical deﬁnition of
‘local’.
c. Report the deﬁnition used for ‘signiﬁcant locations
of operation’.

Measures based on data already collected internally by many
organizations
-Average payment timea for suppliers as well as longest
payment time during a period
-Supplier legal suits pending and settled
-Characteristics of the top managers of contracting
organizations in terms of race, sex, national origin, age

Notes: Voluntary standards related to stakeholder groups.
a
Already consistently reported in some form. The reporting format and measurement processes would become standardized for this information, thus making it easier for the
relevant stakeholder to ﬁnd.

Risk factor

Stakeholder

Table I. Continued
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make good assessments of investment risks, as indicated by an asterisk next to these
items.
We recommend that that the public accounting profession, represented by the
AICPA, work closely with the FASB and organizations such as the GRI, the Fair Labor
Association, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTD), and
the Social Accountability Network to develop standards for reporting that are fair and
reasonable. These and other organizations have developed voluntary standards and procedures that provide a background for understanding the type of information that is
being compiled and reported. In particular, the GRI guidelines have become the predominant global standard for this sort of reporting (KPMG, 2013). The far right column
of Table I presents examples of the GRI standards related to a variety of stakeholders.
The GRI standards are not a solution to the problem, but the beginning of a learning
process through which the AICPA and FASB can learn about and develop appropriate
reporting standards for information relevant to a broader group of stakeholders.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In sum, we argue in this paper that the public accounting profession should reconsider
its position with regard to stakeholder reporting. We argue that the timing is right for
the changes we have proposed herein because of all the voluntary reporting initiatives
that have sprung up and because the public in general has lost much of its conﬁdence in
corporations in spite of current ﬁnancial reporting requirements, both of which are indications of a worldwide interest in holding large businesses more accountable and
accountable to a broader group of stakeholders than just ﬁnancial investors. We have
made a normative argument for this expansion of responsibility on the basis of two principles that are foundational to current arguments supporting shareholder dominance:
implied contracts and residual risk. Based on the principle of fairness, we have also identiﬁed the most worthy stakeholders for reporting purposes as those that contribute significant resources to the value-creating processes of the ﬁrm thereby assuming residual
risk. In addition, an analysis based on institutional theory suggests that broader reporting is inevitable, and that the public accounting profession should assume an increased
leadership role in its institutionalization. Finally, we have used efﬁciency arguments to
suggest that public accounting is in the logical position to lead this effort.
We openly acknowledge that an alternative perspective exists. For example, Benston
(1982) wrote a compelling article outlining some of the reasons the public accounting
profession should not be involved in the reporting of anything other than the results of
deﬁned market transactions (for a critique of his arguments see Schreuder and
Ramanathan, 1984). He defends his position by arguing that managers have very little
discretion to make decisions that are not in the best interests of shareholders due to markets for goods and services, ﬁnance and corporate control, management services, and
current monitoring systems. Furthermore, he suggests that managers will treat customers, employees, and other stakeholders well because it is good business, and therefore
beneﬁcial to shareholders. Consequently, the logical conclusion is that broader stakeholder reporting is unnecessary to insure appropriate behaviour of managers, and therefore a waste of resources. What we ﬁnd most interesting (but not surprising) in this
C 2015 John Wiley & Sons Ltd and Society for the Advancement of Management Studies
V

Responsible Accounting for Stakeholders

955

argument is its dependence on shareholder welfare, which is mentioned repeatedly in
defense of Benston’s arguments. We note, however, that if the shareholder dominance
position is removed from his arguments they lose much of their logical appeal.
Benston (1982) also argues, and legitimately so in our view, that stakeholder-based
phenomena are hard (or perhaps impossible) to measure (cf, Agle et al. 2008). We do
not deny these difﬁculties, but rather believe it is because of the problems inherent in
the measuring and reporting of non-ﬁnancial costs that accountants should be
involved, given their expertise in the compilation, development and reporting of
ﬁnancial information. Benston (1982, p. 102) concedes that the skills of accountants
would be useful for this sort of reporting. The SEC in its 1980 report to Congress on
the public accounting profession stated ‘it seems clear that auditors in the future will
be required to become associated more and more with disclosures which are based
on greater subjectivity and imprecise determination’ (SEC, 1980, p. 72). As the SEC
predicted, accountants are no longer limited to the reporting of past, unambiguously
veriﬁable transactions. Fair market valuation of investment securities and discontinued
operations as well as determination of postretirement beneﬁt costs are just three of
the many inherently ambiguous measurements that accountants are routinely
required to evaluate. Further, non-ﬁnancial costs that were once considered too difﬁcult to measure such as carbon emissions are now routinely reported to regulatory
entities.
Another potential argument against reporting based upon accounting for residualrisk stakeholders is the expense. However, some research suggests that organizations
that are voluntarily engaging in these efforts are not suffering ﬁnancially. For example,
with regard to implementing the ISO 9000 standards, several researchers have found
that certiﬁed organizations have higher performance (Chow-Chua et al., 2003; Corbett
et al., 2005; Heras et al., 2002; Naveh and Marcus, 2007; Rajan and Tamimi, 2003)
and voluntary sustainability reporting has been linked to lower cost of capital and higher
quality earnings (Dhaliwal et al., 2012; Kim et al., 2012). We concede that some of these
ﬁndings may be due, in part, to reverse causality – better performing companies seek
certiﬁcation and report on it – but we do not believe this argument is sufﬁcient justiﬁcation not to require a higher level of disclosure.
Although we have focused in this paper on reporting for residual-risk stakeholders,
we recognize that investors may also ﬁnd stakeholder accounting useful. Firms that are,
for example, doing undesirable things to their employees, are producing shoddy products, are heavily polluting the environment, or are not treating their suppliers fairly are
just as much at risk of reduced performance or even failure as ﬁrms with other types of
risk (i.e., Graves and Waddock, 1994). Of course, employees will use this information
when they are determining whether they want to join an organization or remain with it,
suppliers will use it when they are assessing whether they want to supply the organization, and communities will use it when they are determining whether a company should
be allowed to expand (e.g., permits) and in determining appropriate regulations. But the
point is that there is some potential synergy in this sort of reporting because investors
can also make use of it.
The expanded reporting suggested in this paper will also help level the playing ﬁeld
by inducing ﬁrms to be more authentic; that is, exhibit more consistency between stated
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values and actual behaviour (Cording et al., 2014; Freeman and Auster, 2011; Liedtka,
2008). Because their reports will be audited by a third party, ﬁrms will no longer enjoy
the luxury of making as many unfounded statements about their behaviours with regard
to issues that are vital to stakeholders.
From an academic perspective, these recommendations could result in exciting new
research. Currently researchers have to rely on limited data such as the KLD database
and a few other sources. Standardized stakeholder-based reporting across corporations
would allow a higher level of measurement precision as well as the potential to investigate more issues of concern to both stakeholders and the broader society. It will also
provide more opportunities for understanding stakeholder information needs and the
processes through which those needs evolve. For example, researchers will be able to
more accurately assess the cost/beneﬁt tradeoffs associated with a wider range of corporate behaviours. Best practices for stakeholder treatment will be easier to determine
(Freeman et al., 2010). Basically, better data for research can help advance the knowledge base for both business practitioners and policy makers.
Through a critique of the existing theory underlying shareholder primacy, and a
reapplication of some of this same theory to a broader group of stakeholders, this paper
has laid a normative foundation for a new theoretical and practical perspective on the
responsibility of the public accounting profession. Also, our analysis based on institutional theory suggests that the accounting profession will eventually be compelled to
make these changes even if they are resisted at present. We have therefore recommended that the accounting profession should build upon existing voluntary reporting
initiatives, and we have provided examples to illustrate the types of stakeholder-based
measures that might be considered. We therefore consider the emergence of stakeholder
accounting –as an institution – to be well underway; and we encourage each of its stakeholders to use their inﬂuence toward the development of the more-effective and morerepresentative discipline that we believe to be possible.
NOTE
[1] Former President of the American Finance Association.
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